2155.01 Showing That the Disclosure Was Made by the Inventor or a Joint Inventor [R-07.2022]
[Editor Note: This MPEP section is only applicable to applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). See MPEP § 2159 et seq. to determine whether an application is subject to examination under the FITF provisions, and MPEP § 2131–MPEP § 2138 for examination of applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102.]
AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(A) provides that a grace period disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) if the disclosure was made by the inventor or a joint inventor. An applicant may show that a disclosure was made by the inventor or a joint inventor by way of an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(a) (an affidavit or declaration of attribution). See In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450, 455, 215 USPQ 14, 18 (CCPA 1982) and MPEP § 717.01(a)(1) . Where the authorship of the prior art disclosure includes the inventor or a joint inventor named in the application, an unequivocal statement from the inventor or a joint inventor that the inventor or joint inventor (or some combination of named inventors) invented the subject matter of the disclosure, accompanied by a reasonable explanation of the presence of additional authors, may be acceptable in the absence of evidence to the contrary. See In re DeBaun, 687 F.2d 459, 463, 214 USPQ 933, 936 (CCPA 1982). When any claim of an application or a patent under reexamination is rejected, the applicant or patent owner may submit an appropriate affidavit or declaration to except a disclosure as prior art by establishing that the disclosure was made by the inventor or a joint inventor, or the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. However, an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(a) that is only a naked assertion of inventorship and that fails to provide any context, explanation or evidence to support that assertion is insufficient. See EmeraChem Holdings, LLC v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 859 F.3d 1341, 123 USPQ2d 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2017). See also Ex parte Kroger, 219 USPQ 370 (Bd. App. 1982) (affirming rejection notwithstanding declarations by the alleged actual inventors as to their inventorship in view of a nonapplicant author submitting a letter declaring the nonapplicant author’s inventorship). This is similar to the process for disqualifying a publication as not being by “others” discussed in MPEP § 2132.01, except that AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(A) requires only that the disclosure be by the inventor or a joint inventor.
The following examples are provided for illustration only:
On April 7, 2021, an attorney for AB Corp. files a U.S. nonprovisional patent application claiming subject matter X. Anwesha is the inventor named in a signed application data sheet (ADS), but there is no inventor’s oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 of record. The examiner finds a journal article disclosing subject matter X with a publication date of November 1, 2020, which is within the grace period. The journal article lists Anwesha and Bob as coauthors. There is no evidence of record to indicate that Bob did not invent subject matter X disclosed in the journal article. Accordingly, the examiner rejects the claim to X as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) by the journal article. In response to the prior art rejection, AB Corp.’s attorney files a declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(a) signed by Anwesha averring that she is the sole inventor of the subject matter X disclosed in the article. Anwesha also explains in the declaration that Bob was a graduate student working under her direction and supervision and did not contribute to the conception of the claimed invention. In other words, Anwesha’s declaration establishes that Bob was not a joint inventor of subject matter X.
The examiner should withdraw the rejection because the declaration establishes that the journal article is not prior art. Anwesha’s declaration includes a statement that Anwesha invented X, so there is no need for the examiner to require a signed inventor’s oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 at this time in order to withdraw the rejection. Furthermore, the declaration properly includes a reasonable explanation of Bob’s involvement with the journal article. A statement from Bob is not needed. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Bob was a joint inventor of X.
An attorney for AB Corp. files a U.S. patent application disclosing and claiming subject matter Y on June 2, 2021. Alexis is the inventor named in a signed ADS, but there is no inventor’s oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 on file. The examiner finds a U.S. patent application publication (PGPub) claiming subject matter Y and Z that was published on January 14, 2021, which is within the grace period. The PGPub lists Alexis and Mehdi as joint inventors. There is no evidence of record to indicate that Mehdi did not invent subject matter Y as disclosed and claimed in the PGPub to Alexis and Mehdi. Accordingly, the examiner rejects the claim to Y as being anticipated by the PGPub under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) based on its publication date, and under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) based on its effectively filed date.
In response to the prior art rejections, AB Corp.’s attorney files a 37 CFR 1.130(a) declaration signed by Alexis averring that she invented subject matter Y as disclosed and claimed in the PGPub. The examiner should maintain the rejections under both 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) because the declaration fails to establish that Mehdi is not a joint inventor of Y. Alexis’ declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(a) does include a statement that Alexis invented Y, so there is no need for the examiner to require a signed inventor’s oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 at this time in order to withdraw the rejection. However, Alexis’ declaration is ineffective because it lacks a reasonable explanation of Mehdi’s role in the PGPub. If Alexis’ declaration had stated that Mehdi was named as an inventor of the PGPub because Mehdi invented Z, the declaration would have been sufficient; a corroborating statement from Mehdi would not have been needed.
Note that in accordance with compact prosecution, it is appropriate in Example 2 for the examiner to reject under both sections of 35 U.S.C. 102(a) because the U.S. patent document reference has a public availability date (that is, either a publication date or an issue date) within the grace period. If the 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) date had been prior to the grace period, then no 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) rejection over the same disclosure would have been necessary because no exception could possibly have applied to overcome the 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) rejection. Given the facts of Example 2, however, an applicant’s response could possibly establish an exception to overcome one of the rejections while allowing the examiner to maintain the other rejection. At the time that a rejection is made, the examiner cannot foresee how the applicant will respond. Thus, in order to conclude prosecution in a timely manner and avoid the possibility of an additional non-final action, the examiner should make both a 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) rejection and a 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) rejection when the 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) date of a U.S. patent document is within the grace period year.
On March 16, 2021, an attorney for Acme Corp. files a U.S. patent application claiming subject matter X. Ali is the inventor named in a signed ADS, but there is no inventor’s oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 on record. The examiner finds a September 10, 2021 U.S. patent application publication (PGPub) that names Ming as the inventor and that discloses but does not claim subject matter X. The effectively filed date of Ming’s application is January 7, 2020, which is before Acme’s filing date. Therefore, Ming’s PGPub is potential prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2). However, Ming’s PGPub is not potential prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) because it published after Acme’s filing date. The examiner should reject the claim to X under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Ming’s PGPub. At the time of the rejection, the examiner has no information about Ali’s interaction with Ming.
In the reply to the Office action, Acme’s attorney files a declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(a) signed by Ali to show that Ming’s disclosure of X is not prior art because Ming learned about X from Ali. The declaration from Ali explains the circumstances under which Ali privately told Ming about X. Ali’s declaration does not state that Ali is the inventor of X.
The examiner should maintain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) because the record fails to establish that Ali invented X. Specifically, Ali’s 37 CFR 1.130(a) declaration does not state that Ali invented X, and there is also no inventor’s oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 of record to establish that Ali invented X. Thus, although Ali told Ming about X, it is not clearly established on the record that Al invented X. In order to establish that the exception under 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(A) applies and overcome the rejection, it is necessary to establish that Ali invented X. Acme’s attorney could do that by submitting either a new declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(a) which states that Ali invented X or an inventor’s oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 signed by Ali.
Note that, in this example, determining the grace period is not needed because the grace period is only relevant to potential prior art as of a public availability date. In other words, the grace period is only relevant when there is potential prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1). In this example, Ming’s PGPub was not publicly available until after Acme Corp. filed the application claiming X. Therefore, Ming’s PGPub was not prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and no exceptions involving the grace period can possibly apply.
Similar to Example 3, on March 16, 2021, an attorney for Acme Corp. files a U.S. patent application claiming subject matter X. In contrast to Example 3, an inventor’s oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 signed by Ali is with the application. The examiner finds a U.S. patent to Gopal that issued on November 10, 2020 and discloses but does not claim subject matter X. Gopal’s patent is potential prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) because the issue date of Gopal’s patent is before Acme’s filing date and falls within the grace period. Accordingly, it is possible for an exception under 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(A) to apply. In addition, the effectively filed date of Gopal’s application is also before Acme’s filing date, so Gopal’s patent is potential prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) as well.
Similar to example 2, it is appropriate for the examiner to reject the claims to X as anticipated under both sections of 35 U.S.C. 102(a) because the reference is a U.S. patent document having a public availability date (in this case, an issue date) that is within the grace period. The examiner should be aware that it is possible for the applicant to invoke a prior art exception under 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(A) and show that Gopal’s patent is not prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) but Gopal’s patent still remains available as prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2). Therefore, the examiner should make anticipation rejections under both 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) in accordance with compact prosecution guidance. At the time of the rejection, the examiner has no information about Ali’s interaction with Gopal.
In reply to the Office action, Acme’s attorney files a 37 CFR 1.130(a) declaration signed by Gopal averring that Ali told him about subject matter X as disclosed in Gopal’s patent. In the reply, Acme’s attorney also calls the examiner’s attention to the fact that an inventor’s oath or declaration signed by Ali is already of record. Note that this example is similar to example 3, but here Gopal signs the 37 CFR 1.130(a) declaration rather than Ali.
The examiner should withdraw the rejections under both 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) based on the Gopal patent because the evidence of record establishes that the disclosure of X in Gopal’s patent is attributable to Ali. In other words, there is evidence of record that Ali invented X and Gopal’s disclosure originated with Ali. In view of Gopal’s 37 CFR 1.130(a) declaration, it is clear that Gopal did not invent X because the record shows that Gopal learned about it from Ali. Furthermore, there is an inventor’s oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63, signed by Ali, of record in the application file. The above evidence shows that Ali is an inventor of X.
Note that, in this example, the fact that Gopal’s patent did not claim X eliminates the possibility of derivation. If Gopal’s patent did claim X, then derivation issues may be present. The PTAB will consider instituting a derivation proceeding when a patent applicant submits a petition under 37 CFR 42.402 alleging derivation by an earlier applicant or patentee.